Uses Unaddressed:
How Social Technologies Tacitly Allow Gender-Based Violence
Honors Thesis
Brooke Marston
Advisor: Nora Draper

University of New Hampshire
Department of Communication
May 2021

1

Abstract
Growing technological capabilities have enhanced and intensified the potential for
surveillance in many areas of life. Particularly, the placement of advanced technology in the
hands of everyday people has produced ample opportunities for interpersonal monitoring. This
growing capacity to surveil others we know without sophisticated techniques has concerning
implications for acts of gender-based violence and intimate partner violence, which often hinge
on surveillance, isolation, and control. Often, technology is used to the advantage of abusers in
achieving such ends, and the wealth of personal information that is often available online leaves
users vulnerable to acts of gender-based violence such as cyberstalking. In the following
analysis, I systematically and forensically interrogate the seemingly mundane apps Find My and
Venmo to investigate how these and other apps could be used to aid in such behaviors, paying
special attention to privacy settings and account security features. I find that these apps generally
overlook special risks that are often present in gender-based violence and intimate partner
violence, especially hindering users’ efforts towards independence when their account may be
compromised by an abuser. Additionally, limited privacy settings on social apps like Venmo
leave an abundance of personal information publicly accessible with few options to improve
security while continuing to use the service. In light of these findings, I make recommendations
to help alleviate gender-based privacy and safety concerns, including more equal gender
representation in technological development, and more advanced security features such as
fingerprint identification or facial recognition.

Keywords: gender-based violence, intimate partner violence, privacy, surveillance, gender and
technology
technlogy
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I. Introduction
Querying “how to spy on my girlfriend” generates about 75 million web search results on
Google. Among these entries, countless articles promise solutions to track the activity of an
intimate partner, from call and text history all the way to social media sites like Facebook. The
most common suggestion is the installation of malware apps on the suspected partner’s devices,
which can either be planted as a phishing link in an innocent-looking email, or discreetly
installed on the device while its owner isn’t around. Once installed, these apps run in the
background while the device can continue to be used as normal— all while reporting a host of
private information remotely to the attacker, including call and text history, keystrokes, web
browsing history, social media activity, geolocation, and even audio and/or video recording.
The use of technology in order to facilitate surveillance, isolation, and control of a
romantic partner is a modern extension of traditionally recognized abusive behaviors known as
intimate partner violence (CDC, 2020). Intimate partner violence is additionally closely related
to the concept of gender-based violence, which constitutes violent acts carried out on the basis of
a person’s perceived sex or gender identity (Ott, 2017). While gender-based violence affects
people of all genders, women are statistically most likely to encounter such threats in everyday
life and in intimate relationships. The World Health Organization (2021) have found that 1 in 3
women have experienced physical or sexual abuse in their lifetimes, which does not factor in
other types of gender-based violence and intimate partner violence such as financial and
emotional abuse. Additionally, due to differing legal definitions of various acts of gender-based
violence between different nations, as well as the social stigma (and often physical danger)
surrounding reporting, the actual number of women who have experienced some form of
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gender-based violence is much more difficult to ascertain and likely higher than current figures
suggest.
While the malware apps described above are generally only accessible off-market due to
their dubious purposes, mainstream app stores are otherwise populated by free or low-cost
software with a variety of uses, from entertainment to finance management to health monitoring.
Alongside this rapid technological growth has emerged a modern crisis in privacy. While we’ve
come to rely on apps, websites, and social media for our day-to-day lives, these platforms have
surreptitiously collected and compiled a wealth of our personal information, primarily for the
purposes of selling to advertisers and marketing agencies. While the data collection capabilities
of giant corporations have come into greater focus in light of events such as the
Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal in 2018, the interpersonal risks posed by such
highly capable technologies have only recently been the focus of scholarly and public attention.
Even the most mundane apps collect personal information, and the potential for exploitation of
access to that information in order to surveil, isolate, and control others is a formidable threat
further complicating the struggle to quash gender-based violence and intimate partner violence.

II. Literature Review
IIa. Intimate Surveillance, Tracking, and Apps
Karen Levy (2015) uses the term intimate surveillance to encapsulate acts of
data-gathering in the realm of intimate relationships and behaviors, including interpersonal
relationship tracking, health-related tracking of one’s own ovulation and fertility for family
planning, and individual or interpersonal sexual wellness tracking. Intimate surveillance has
emerged in recent years as an interpersonal phenomenon that has exponentially increased in part
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due to the proliferation of personal technologies like the smartphone and social media. Levy
argues that today it is more common and socially expected for people to perform acts of intimate
surveillance upon themselves and those they know, rather than be subjected to institutional
surveillance-- that which is conducted by outside bodies such as researchers or governments.
Much of this surveillance is conducted interpersonally through the use of software applications
(apps), which are specialized to “solve particular, often singular, user needs” (Light et al., 2016).
While apps are commonly associated with the smartphone, they are not exclusive to mobile
technologies, and are often accessible through other means such as on a personal computer.
However, smartphones are closely linked to the concept of the app because of the way these
devices uniquely rely on and emphasize apps in order to structure and segment user activity.
The ever-increasing volume of both apps and users has revealed a trove of previously
unknown data and personal information that can be collected, stored, and shared. Some of the
world’s most used apps, such as social media giant Facebook, rely heavily on the sharing of
personal information to create the user’s experience— allowing the user to connect with other
people from both on- and offline based on information they choose to share, such as “likes”,
hobbies, and more personal information such as where they work or the city they reside in—
while this information in turn drives Facebook’s profit model. Mobile technologies in particular
have brought about many new forms of surveillance that are somewhat unique to the medium.
One such example is the introduction of user-friendly location services that are integrated into
apps to help a user get directions, find businesses or other establishments close to them, or even
locate other people in close geographic proximity (Spiekermann, 2004).
Health-related tracking has also risen in prominence, in part due to location services as
well as the development of enhanced wearable technologies such as the Fitbit and Apple Watch.

6

The capability to track health characteristics has greatly increased through the invention of such
devices, and this is the foundation of the quantified self movement that has become increasingly
relevant in the mid to late 2010s (Lupton, 2016). At the heart of this movement is the notion that
the ability to collect and analyze as much data about the self as possible-- between our bodies,
minds, and movements-- is integral to self-improvement efforts (Wolf, 2009). Increasingly, data
related to intimate relationships and behaviors has been incorporated into this suite of data that
users and developers seek to track, quantify, and analyze. Lupton (2015) makes note of
numerous “sex tracker” apps into which data about sexual activity can be either manually
inputted or recorded using smartphone features such as the microphone. The purported benefit of
such apps to the user is to generate metrics of sexual performance, and ultimately, to encourage
self-improvement and enhance sexual relationships.
The millions of apps now available through official channels such as the Apple App Store
and Google Play Store, spanning a wide variety of categories such as health, finance, education
and entertainment, competition for users’ loyalty and attention has led to the integration of social
conditioning practices into many apps’ user interfaces to increase desired forms of participation.
One widely observable technique to encourage information-sharing is the practice of
gamification, which incorporates aspects of gameplay into the app’s requests in order to
incentivize user participation (Blohm & Leimeister, 2013). For example, an app may award
badges, points, or other symbols of achievement to users who take advantage of its features in an
intended way. These achievements may unlock further access or benefits within the app, and may
also be sharable among a user’s social network. Through the addition of incentives, specific uses
of an app are encouraged, even though the app may have uses beyond the specific ones that are
encouraged (Davis & Chouinard, 2017). Gamification is only one strategy that apps employ to
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create seduction to smartphones-- and ultimately, to surveillance. Troullinou (2017) identifies
gamification along with notions of security, immediacy, and novelty as constructing a seductive
view of surveillance which users are incentivized and attracted towards participating in.

IIb. Normalizing Surveillance
Both heightened achievements in technological systems themselves, along with new and
innovative techniques to incentivize user engagement, have contributed to what Levy refers to as
a normalization of surveillance, and particularly of intimate surveillance (2015). Information that
may have once been kept private is now able to be easily shared, both with our own apps as well
as the people we connect with within them. Thus, while there is not necessarily a requirement to
share intimate information, it may come to be expected from ourselves or others around us in
certain social contexts. For example, many consider it a norm to look for an acquaintance or date
on Facebook or Google before meeting-- not only to ensure safety, but also often out of genuine
curiosity. A certain amount of personal sharing is also advantageous in the career world due to
the prominence of networking sites such as LinkedIn. However, Levy & Schneier (2020) contend
that this trend of normalization in gathering such information leaves technological surveillance
practices vulnerable to exploitation, writing that “well-intentioned intimate monitoring can create
a slippery slope of acceptability, inuring users to accepting surveillance as a mode of social
control in other contexts” (p. 2). For example, the customary and often personal
information-sharing that takes place on social media sites like Facebook (and even moreso on the
intimate tracking apps previously described) can lead to the expectation of extensive private
sharing in intimate relationships, and any desire to retain individual privacy by withholding
certain information may be seen as dishonest or suspicious. While we may partake in
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information-sharing innocuously to learn more about ourselves and improve relationships with
others, it is all the while possible that bad actors may take advantage of the sheer ubiquitousness
of such practices in order to monitor and control others.
The proliferation of interpersonal surveillance activities poses other challenges to our
conception of privacy, with some of the largest issues revolving around the idea of consent. As
Levy (2015) and others have pointed out, some acts of intimate surveilling such as sex tracking
can be conducted by an individual without others’ (such as a partner’s) knowledge or consent.
This fact is clearly problematic, with the removal of informed consent in this particular sitution
being comparable to more broadly recognized acts of sexual violence, without the expected legal
ramifications. With social interaction increasingly aided by the internet and social media,
personal data is often stored online by the choice of the user. While social sharing platforms act
as repositories for our memories and experiences, they also can present our information to others
without our express consent or even our knowledge, due to limited privacy settings that favor
public sharing. This highly accessible wealth of data can create danger in situations of
gender-based violence and intimate partner violence, by allowing an abuser or stalker to identify
and track an individual’s real-world connections such as friends, family, and employers, as well
as specific geolocation data showing where they currently are or have been recently. By the time
a bad actor has accessed this data, it is too late to revoke that access because they may take
screenshots, reach out to friends or acquaintances of the victim to get closer to them, or have
information about them such as location that allows them to carry out a violent act (Freed et al.,
2018).
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IIc. Data Violence and the Building of Gender Bias
Women have historically been underrepresented in the technology sector, making up less
than 30 percent of the tech workforce in the year 2020, leading to a higher proportion of men
than women designing and approving the apps and systems the general public interacts with on a
daily basis (CNBC, 2020). As Faulkner (2001) puts it, women are more likely to be “on the
receiving end” of novel technologies, rather than in the position of creating them (p. 80). In
regards to intimate surveillance, Levy (2018) purports that women are more often constructed as
monitored subjects than men, who are more likely to be placed in control of data collection either
as users or developers. For example, many of the sex tracking apps analyzed by both Levy
(2018) and Lupton (2015) are clearly organized around masculine and heteronormative ideals,
using metrics such as duration of sex and number of partners to generate analyses of
performance. As more mainstream examples of how these ideals pervade even mundane apps,
some may recall how Facebook began as a website for Harvard students to rate female students
based on attractiveness, or how YouTube’s founders were inspired to create a video-sharing
platform after they were unable to find videos of Janet Jackson’s wardrobe malfunction, which
exposed her bare breast, at a Super Bowl Halftime Show performance in 2004. Historically,
women on the internet have been constructed more as objects to view than as fellow users. Their
relationship to technology has long been questioned and doubted, and they often are excluded
from digital culture movements such as fan cultures (Scott, 2019).
The lack of equal gender representation in app development can have influential social
and political consequences. Hoffmann (2018) uses the term data violence to describe the idea
that the features that are or are not included in a service or technology can “implicitly and
explicitly lead to harmful or even fatal outcomes” (para. 15). The “biased” technology that may
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come about as a result of underrepresentation is not always based on an explicit desire to
discriminate, but rather, an implicit ignorance as a result of social privilege leading to the
exclusion or underrepresentation of diverse perspectives. As already noted, the growing realm of
sex tracking apps seem to be almost exclusively crafted around masculine and heteronormative
perspectives, norms, and ideals regarding sex, and this approach has lead to apps that are
unwelcoming of and possibly even incompatible with users who are women or members of the
LGBTQ+ community. In the case of apps with broader uses, such as social media platforms or
web search engines, gender bias may appear not only as explicit displays of sexism which
reinforce cultural bias and discrimination, but more subtly in a lack of safeguards against sexist
behavior.

IId. The Growing Role of Technology in Abusive Situations
Technology often intersects with and magnifies other abusive behaviors that are present
in intimate partner violence situations, by potentially aiding an abuser in surveilling their victim
in an effort to control activity. As already described, social media platforms host a wealth of
information about people that is generally easily accessible, especially by people who know each
other offline or have mutual friends. This can prove dangerous in situations of intimate partner
violence, as abusers can take advantage of this knowledge in order to surveil and isolate
survivors. The shift of many spheres of daily life, such as communication, career, and
entertainment, to online platforms presents greater opportunities for abusers to exert control in
places where this once would have been more difficult. Particularly in situations where abusers
and their partners cohabitate, abusers may be able to gain even more access into personal
accounts by guessing passwords or coercing their partners to reveal them (Freed et al., 2018).
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As the data collection and information sharing capabilities of our personal devices were
just beginning to enter public focus, Mason and Magnet (2012) argued that although
surveillance, privacy and security are of high concern to users, the implications of such
technologies for women in abusive situations were largely unnoticed by the public. As they note,
strategies of consumer surveillance such as screen capturing and tracking location using GPS
mirror strategies that abusers have used to track their intimate partners. Surveillance is
purposeful as a form of exerting control at both institutional and interpersonal levels, and new
technologies have aided and simplified the act of surveillance for the typical user. While
“high-tech” strategies such as installing malware or hiding GPS trackers have been utilized by
abusers, these often can be complicated, expensive, and risky. Now, as Mason and Magnet
(2012) purport, simple tracking systems integrated into common apps like Facebook and Twitter
are highly accessible and convenient in monitoring those known to a user. As one example,
Facebook profiles often host a suite of information that may be dangerous in the hands of an
abuser, such as physical locations visited, names and pictures of friends, and contact information
such as phone numbers, email, and workplace information. If we consider the potential roles of
Facebook and other social media platforms as tools for stalking and harassment, it becomes clear
that much of the technology used to engage in these violent acts is widespread and easily
accessible, and already in use by much of the population.
Safeguards against abusive behavior on social media platforms fall even shorter when an
abuser has physical access to their partner. While password protection and other security efforts
purport to ensure only the owner of a private profile has access to it, such efforts are ineffective
when a victim lives with their abuser, who can coerce them to reveal passwords and may even
have legal ownership of their devices. Freed et al. (2018) argue that conventional security threat
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models in technology “do not anticipate attackers who possess such intimate knowledge” of their
targets, instead building account protection mechanisms more likely to fend off unknown hackers
and strangers (p. 1). However, the reality is that often privacy attacks are carried out by
interacting with standard user interfaces, rather than through more technologically sophisticated
techniques. Freed et al. (2018) refer to these attackers as UI-bound adversaries, meaning that
they conduct intimate partner violence or other forms of gender-based violence within the
constraints of the apps’ intended uses. For example, in the above scenario, an abuser may gain
access to their partner’s various social, financial, and professional accounts by coercing them
into revealing account information. With this information, the abuser can easily log into these
accounts as if they were the owner, gaining access to private information ranging from messages
and emails to bank or credit card information. After compromising the account, the abuser is able
to wield a high level of control and can change passwords and other information, revoke the
original owner’s access, or delete the accounts entirely. For the original owner, regaining control
may be difficult and even unsafe, as the attacker may be alerted to password or security setting
changes, and this can lead to retaliation and even violence (Freed et al., 2018). Notions of
account security are further clouded by the existence of financial and legal arrangements such as
family phone service plans, where multiple devices are bundled under one account and generally
managed by one owner (Draper, 2014). Any group willing to enter into a financial agreement can
generally sign up for such plans, regardless of their relationship. However, the family plan
imposes a more traditional power imbalance in favor of the designated “owner” of the plan,
conferring additional service features such as geolocation tracking of other devices on the plan,
ability to monitor and limit usage of features such as calling or texting, and ability to restrict and
filter the types of content viewed on the device (Draper, 2014). These features are generally
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viewed as more appropriate within the context of parents or guardians and their children, but
when it is two adults who share such a plan, the features can be problematically exploited by the
owner to facilitate surveillance and control.

IIe. Financial Information as Social and Personal
In addition to integrating all kinds of identifying and personal data into social interfaces,
some apps have even shifted towards personalizing and socializing our most mundane data. The
social payment app Venmo, owned by the online payment company PayPal, uniquely attempts to
do this by adding a social component to interpersonal payments. Venmo looks much like a
minimalist version of a traditional social media app, with all of the basic components-- a profile
complete with name and picture, a friends list, and an activity feed where users can leave likes
and comments on their friends’ posts. However, the only type of activities recorded in this feed
are financial transactions between users, annotated with a personalized caption and with the
actual amount of the transaction hidden from public view. With its resemblance to other social
media platforms, Swartz (2020) purports that Venmo is a kind of natural extension of our
entrustment of social media platforms to retain and mediate our memories. Just as Facebook
holds onto our social memories in the forms of photos, wall posts, and private messages, Venmo
serves as a repository for our transactional memories. At the same time, Venmo retains a social
component to these financial transactions, through the additional affordances of a friends list,
liking and commenting features, and captions for each transaction.
In situations of intimate partner violence, financial power is often exerted as a means of
maintaining an abuser’s isolation and control. As mentioned previously by Freed et al. (2018),
abusers often have financial power over survivors that makes it very difficult for them to hold on
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to their independence or to regain it when attempting to leave an abusive situation. Technology is
an extension of such wealth, as cell phones and computers remain luxury goods despite their
increasing necessity in all spheres of life. Particularly in situations where an abuser and their
partner live together, the abuser may pay the phone bill or even technically “own” the device
through arrangements such as family plans. This fact is highly problematic when considering
how an abuser might be able to make legal claim over their partner’s phone or other device, even
if their intentions are to use that device to steal their information or leverage it against them as an
additional layer of control (Freed et al., 2018).

IIf. “Dual-Use” as Abuse
Davis and Chouinard (2017) outline a mechanisms framework illustrating how an
artifact’s affordances vary by degree. Specifically, they purport that artifacts “request, demand,
allow, encourage, discourage, and refuse” (p. 241). This framework can be applied to apps in the
sense that certain courses of action within an app can be emphasized, while other courses of
action may be hidden or made impossible, due to the app’s features such as design and layout.
When an action is not refused, but at the same time not specifically encouraged or even
discouraged, it is allowed (Davis and Chouinard, 2017). These distinctions are important because
they highlight how an app may allow itself to be used for particular purposes, even if those
purposes are outside its intended mode of use.
Within this vein of reasoning, Chatterjee et al. (2018) use the term dual-use apps to
describe “a class of tools that have some advertised use unrelated to intimate partner tracking . . .
but that are easily and effectively repurposed for intimate partner surveillance, often with the
tacit support of app vendors” (p. 441). This means that while an app may have an advertised
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purpose that is innocuous, such as helping to locate a lost phone or monitoring a child’s internet
activity for safety, that app may at the same time allow itself to be used as a means of surveilling
an intimate partner by lacking any safeguards against such use (Draper, 2019; Hasinoff, 2017).
While partner spying and surveillance apps are not difficult to come by, dual-use apps are
arguably more insidious. They are easier to justify having, given their more innocuous intended
uses such as preserving safety or preventing theft. Additionally, given these advertised uses, they
are more likely to not be flagged by app stores’ vetting procedures for content and safety, despite
their potential uses for harm. Levy (2018) argues that developers bear ethical responsibility for
their apps’ privacy consequences despite intentions, saying that “the very design of the
technology makes determinations about the scope of intimate privacy” (p. 23). Now that these
capabilities are so widespread and accessible, the lack of safeguards against privacy threats from
those close to us are becoming more and more difficult to justify.

III. Methodology
The research for this paper draws primarily upon affordance theory, a concept originally
advanced by Donald A. Norman (1999). Norman uses the term affordance to refer to a
technological artifact’s properties, both perceived and actual. Norman additionally purports that
an artifact’s affordances “provide strong clues to the operations” of that artifact— a user
understands in what ways the artifact can be used simply by looking at it, without any further
instruction being necessary (p. 9). This same logic can be extended to digital technologies, and
by examining the affordances of a digital technology, some insight can be gained about its
intended uses.
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Davis and Chouinard (2017) expand upon affordance theory by proposing a system of
interrelated mechanisms through which artifacts afford or don’t afford to various degrees. In the
context of digital technologies This framework relies on the idea that the affordances of a
technology vary by degree, offering insights into what sorts of uses are explicitly intended,
tacitly permitted, or outright prevented. Specifically, they propose that artifacts “request,
demand, allow, encourage, discourage, and refuse” (2017, p. 2). This analysis will incorporate
the mechanisms framework by interrogating the range of potential uses within each app, and
specifically focusing on such actions that may not be intended but are nonetheless tacitly
allowed.
In the following analysis, I consider both the device tracking app Find My and the
payment app Venmo. These apps are both widely used; Find My is pre-installed by default on
every Apple product, making it highly accessible to the owners of some 1.65 billion active Apple
devices worldwide, while Venmo reported having over 60 million active users in 2019 (Welch,
2021; de Best, 2021). They also both have seemingly innocuous and utilitarian purposes— Find
My can be used to locate Apple devices that are synced with a user’s account using geolocation
technology, or to locate others known to the user who have consented to sharing location data
using their own Apple devices, while Venmo is primarily used for sending instant payments
which can then be publicly viewed in either a global feed or by friends of the user.
Both apps are to be investigated using the walkthrough method as outlined by Light,
Burgess, and Duguay (2016). The walkthrough method is an approach to app analysis in which
the researcher, having discerned the app’s expected environment of use, “deploys a walkthrough
technique to systematically and forensically step through the various stages of app registration
and entry, everyday use and discontinuation of use” (p. 881). This method involves direct
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interaction with the app’s user interface to determine intended uses, to investigate how options
and uses are portrayed, and to understand cultural meanings that may be embedded in choices
regarding the app’s design and development.
As somewhat mundane apps without the primary purpose of dating, hooking up, or other
general social networking, both Find My and Venmo risk being overlooked when considering
how a perpetrator of harassment, intimate partner violence, or other forms of gender based
violence may use app features to achieve outcomes not necessarily intended by the app’s
creators. I apply the walkthrough method in analyzing these apps in order to build a foundation
of the apps’ intended uses, recalling Davis and Chouinard’s (2017) mechanisms framework of
affordance theory to describe these uses in further detail and to distinguish possible uses that
seem to fall outside of the apps’ intended purposes, yet are allowed by their interfaces.
Lastly, I draw upon available research in the role of technology in surveillance and
gender-based violence to make sense of the data gathered, making use of critical technocultural
discourse analysis (CTDA), an approach which applies critical theory to analyses of
technological development and use (Brock, 2016). Although intimate partner violence and other
forms of abusive behavior may affect any individual regardless of their gender, women as a
group are disproportionately impacted by such behaviors. Thus, a critical lens is necessary for
any link between technological development and gendered violence to be considered. Using
CTDA and the information gathered using the walkthrough method, I will put forth potential
implications of my apps of focus as well as other mundane technologies on current and future
patterns of both surveillance and gender-based violence, and discuss future considerations that
could be made in technological development generally to help prevent unintended misuse of
technologies and safeguard users from experiencing gender-based violence.
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IV. Analysis & Discussion
IVa. Venmo
Venmo upends the supposed banality of splitting bills and settling up by thrusting these
transactions into the social world, through the inclusion of social media elements such as likes
and comments, a friends list, and an activity feed. Although available to any user with a bank
account over the age of 13, the app appears to implicitly target young adults, who are
prominently featured in images on Venmo’s homepage. The most basic version of Venmo is free
to use for sending person-to-person payments not for goods or services, but users may take
advantage of a “freemium” model where they can pay to have money received moved to their
bank account instantly, and a business feature for merchants in which Venmo charges a fee per
transaction has been recently introduced.
Since Venmo relies on financial transactions, it is required by law to collect a host of
personal information in order to identify users and mitigate risk. To create a basic account, users
must provide their first and last name, email, and phone number. However, to send payments or
transfer money out of Venmo, a bank account or card must be connected, and this in turn may
trigger requests for further information for identity verification purposes such as home address or
social security number. For safety purposes, Venmo requests users input their real name, and add
a photo of themselves so that others can verify with whom they are exchanging money.
Venmo’s privacy settings are deliberately limited in nature. Activity on Venmo, including
transactions as well as likes or comments on those transactions, is made public according to the
app’s default settings (See Fig. 1). The app’s main activity feed, which it boasts as a novel social
component to its mundane purpose, contains three sections: A personal feed where users can
view their own activity, a friends feed where any activity from the user’s approved friends is
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listed, and a global feed, where transactions from any of the millions of Venmo users who have
their activity set to public can appear. From the activity feeds, the user can tap on any name to be
taken to that person’s profile, where their name, username, profile photo, friends list, and activity
(depending on privacy settings) will appear (see Fig. 2).
Additionally, a Venmo profile cannot be made fully private, meaning there are no settings
to prevent a profile from showing up in public search results or on other people’s friends lists,
outside of the option to block specific users. Other information on a user’s profile, including
their full name, profile photo, username, and friends list, cannot be restricted in any way—
leaving a wealth of information publicly accessible that a user may want to remain private. In
this way, it can be argued that Venmo lends itself to potential dual-use for gender-based violence,
particularly in behaviors such as stalking. Even if a user’s activity on Venmo is private, the app
requests other information that is then made public, and this information could be used to
identify a user on other places on the internet such as other social media sites, which are likely to
host even more information. For example, if a user uploaded the same photo to both Venmo and
another social media site such as Facebook or Twitter, the same photo could be accessed and
downloaded through Venmo, then reverse-image searched on any mainstream search engine to
bring up other social media profiles and websites that have that same photo. This indicates that
the inability to hide a photo on Venmo may have serious privacy consequences for someone who
does not want other social media profiles to be discovered.
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Fig. 1 (left): An explanation of Venmo’s public privacy setting, found within the
app. Fig. 2 (right): A screenshot of a random Venmo profile found in the public
feed.

Activity on Venmo additionally incurs an extensive “paper trail” that is intended to
prevent unauthorized activity, but can be problematic if a user is being targeted by a UI-bound
adversary such as an abusive intimate partner. Venmo has a highly customizable set of
notifications to send alerts to the device, email, or phone number associated with the account
when various activities are performed, such as sending a payment or changing account
information (see Fig. 3). Thus, if someone other than the Venmo user had access to that email or
phone number, they could be remotely alerted to any activity on the account as well as attempts
by the original owner to regain control, such as changing the password. As Freed et al. (2018)
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discuss, this situation can potentially be a dangerous one for someone experiencing intimate
partner violence, as an abuser may retaliate after being alerted to their attempts to regain control
of their own account.

Fig. 3 (left): Just a portion of the notifications that can be sent from Venmo when
various activities are performed. Fig. 4 (right): Venmo’s profile settings editor,
where on a browser the user would have the option to close the account— an
option that does not exist within the app.

Although many Venmo notifications can be turned off within the app’s settings, one type
of notification that I found could not be is an email alert triggered after sending a payment. Thus,
even if most traces of Venmo activity can be removed if the user prefers, some activities will still
trigger alerts with no way to prevent them. This may hinder safety for a user who does not want
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their activity shared, and could facilitate financial abuse by making it easy to monitor the
frequency of payments, who they are sent to and received from, and their amounts.
Closing a Venmo account, which a user experiencing intimate partner violence may need
to do for safety, is also complicated by the app’s developers. A Venmo account cannot be closed
through the app’s interface, and instead this action must be performed by using a web browser to
navigate to Venmo’s website, logging in with the appropriate account information, and opting to
close the account. This alternate course of action is not explained within the app at all, and the
option to close an account is simply absent from the settings section (see Fig. 4). Forcing users to
take an unfamiliar route to close their Venmo account lengthens and complicates the process for
a few reasons. For one, since it is not explained in the Venmo app, users might not know of this
option at all— since Venmo activity is conducted primarily through the app, many users may not
even know that a separate website exists, let alone that it has exclusive features. Additionally,
more Americans each year continue to report that they access the internet predominantly using
their smartphones (37% in 2019 [Anderson, 2019]), further indicating that they would likely not
be aware of these features, and would be at a disadvantage in this situation if they did not have
ready access to a computer. Lastly, requiring users to log in with their Venmo account
information when the app automatically keeps users signed in poses additional obstacles, as they
may not easily recall this information and would have to go through the process of resetting their
account’s email or password when time is potentially of the essence.
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IVb. Find My
Combining the features of previous iterations of Find My iPhone and Find My Friends,
Find My serves as a control center that allows the user not only to view the location of their
Apple devices, but to share their location with specified contacts. Users of Apple products
already have an iCloud account associated with their device(s), so there is minimal setup
required to begin using this app. Signing in with an iCloud account brings up an interface
showing a map with pins to indicate the location of Apple devices signed into that account (see
Fig. 5). Selecting a device will bring up additional information, such as the device’s battery level
and the last time its location was recorded. Another option triggers the Maps app (another default
app on Apple devices) to display specific directions from the user’s current location to their
device. There are also numerous commands that can be sent to the device in the event it has been
lost or stolen. It can be made to play sounds to help locate it, or it can be marked as “lost”, which
locks the display on a custom message, and disables standard use of the device and any features
such as Apple Pay (see Fig. 6). The final option listed erases the device completely.

Fig. 5 (left):
Information and options
displayed about an
Apple device when it is
selected from the main
menu.
Fig. 6 (right):
What my iPhone
displayed when
I marked it
as “lost”.
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Find My’s capabilities of remotely altering or disabling a device-- much like Venmo’s
policies of extensive data collection and public display-- have clear purposes in security, a
common rationale for the development and use of surveilling and controlling technologies. If
someone loses their phone, being able to precisely track its location may be immensely helpful in
finding it, and marking it as lost can help a stranger who finds the device to return it to its
original owner. However, in the context of intimate partner violence, it is not difficult to imagine
how these features could be repurposed to surveil and even harass someone. Devices such as
smartphones are an asset to daily life for both convenience and safety, so it is common to have
one within reach almost always. Therefore, someone with access to the associated iCloud
account (such as an abusive partner) could easily track the user’s location without them knowing,
even if they take steps to remain undetected such as turning off data or powering off the device.
Someone else with account access could also use Find My to harass the device’s owner by
disabling the device, making it play sounds that can’t be turned off, or erasing its data
completely. Although these actions are secured with an iCloud account, this does not take into
account the reality that many of the people who experience intimate partner violence cohabitate
with an abusive partner, and may even be financially dependent on them. Thus, an abuser could
coerce their partner into revealing account information that is normally private, or the device
may even be set up in their name (which is often the case with many shared phone service plans
that cohabitating partners may sign up for). Without the additional layer of security provided by
account authentication, Find My acts in a very similar manner to an off-market malware app,
with some of the same capabilities.
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Another feature of Find My that has been just recently introduced is an Items section (see
Fig. 7). This feature allows compatible Bluetooth devices not manufactured by Apple to be
recognized by the app, where they can be tracked in a similar manner to Apple devices. The
Items tab also indicates the capability to identify an unknown Bluetooth item, meaning the owner
can imprint a message and contact information onto the item that can be scanned by Find My if
the item is lost and found by someone else. Although not many of these products are on the
market yet, one of the products listed on Apple’s website is the Chipolo ONE Spot, a small item
finder that can be attached to a larger item for tracking purposes (see Fig. 8). One potential
concern with these kinds of devices is that they may be secretly placed on someone’s property in
order to track location without their knowledge.

Fig. 7 (left): The interface displayed
when selecting the Items tab in Find My.
Fig. 8 (above): Product image of the
Chipolo ONE Spot.
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The recent unveiling of Apple’s AirTags, tracking chips similar to the Chipolo ONE Spot,
is even more concerning. As Fox Cahn and Galperin (2021) point out, the fact that AirTags
operate on the global tracking network shared by every iPhone means that its location tracking
capabilities have the potential to be more precise than any of its current competitors.
Additionally, the mainstreaming of this kind of technology through Apple’s branding, without
much acknowledgement of the potential harm it may cause, is worrying. Leaks of a future iOS
update indicate the future introduction of “Item Safety Features” that can inform a user if there is
an unknown Bluetooth device such as an AirTag moving with them (Fathi, 2021). However,
there is no clear indication of how robust these safety features may be, and the introduction of
such discreet trackers may have problematic implications for people experiencing gender-based
violence or intimate partner violence, especially if they do not have devices that can warn them
of the presence of item trackers, or if they do not know about such devices in the first place.

IVc. Limitations
As established by Light, Burgess, and Duguay (2016), a researcher employing the
walkthrough method may create new accounts for the purposes of research, or use their own.
Due to the extensive integration of my own personal information with my iCloud and Venmo
accounts, I was hindered from creating new accounts for research, as doing so would have wiped
my iPhone and likely triggered a fraud alert from my bank. I also find it meaningful to note how
tightly woven I found my personal, financial, and even physical information to be with my
account data, again proving how such areas contain great exploitative potential in the case of an
account security breach.
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V. Consequences & Recommendations
In stepping through both of these seemingly simple and mundane technologies, one of my
general observations was that traditional mechanisms meant to protect account security are
poised to fail when users are experiencing intimate partner violence. The reasons for this align
with the unique circumstances of many people in intimate partner violence situations, such as
cohabitating with an abusive partner, or being financially dependent on them. Freed et al. (2018)
state that traditional account safeguards, such as having a password or requiring email or phone
number identification, anticipate security threats from strangers rather than someone who is
known to the user— and therefore, are likely to fail when it comes to protecting account security
of users affected by intimate partner violence. In fact, these users can even be put in more unsafe
situations due to the extensive notifications that are sent out when changing account information
such as passwords, which could alert an abuser to the action and cause them to retaliate. These
measures are meant to prevent unauthorized account activity, but may pose a critical obstacle to
users trying to regain their digital independence.
Another observation I made was that these technologies, particularly Find My, work to
normalize substantial data collection and control. Find My collects and reports considerably
far-reaching data about our devices, from their precise location down to their battery level. And
although these capabilities are certainly useful in locating a lost or stolen device, or sharing
location with family members or friends to ensure safety, it is concerning to think about the
amount of highly intimate information that could potentially end up in the wrong hands. Lastly,
in considering Venmo’s unique social component, I found that limited privacy settings—
including having completely public activity as the default profile setting, and not allowing users
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to make their information fully private if they choose— leave a wealth of personal information
out in the open, rendering users vulnerable to threats such as stalking.
Davis and Chouinard’s (2017) suggestion of technologies’ affordances through
mechanisms is appropriate to understanding how the use of mundane apps like Find My and
Venmo for gender-based violence and intimate partner violence is not intended by their creators,
yet can be easily accomplished while operating within their standard user interfaces. While app
features such as identity verification, public activity sharing, and location tracking are intended
to be used to ensure security-- such sharing location with a loved one or ensuring a payment is
sent to the correct user-- more dubious uses of these features as tools to spy on or stalk a stranger,
acquaintance, or intimate partner are not advertised, but still tacitly allowed within the
boundaries of each app. Although apps’ individual terms of service agreements may state that
they are not to be used for illegal activities, many acts of gender-based violence are difficult to
fully encapsulate within a legal definition (governments historically have struggled to legally
define crimes such as sexual violence in a way that acknowledges their complexity, often leading
to a lack of justice for women survivors). As such, these apps’ ability to be repurposed for
stalking and intimate partner tracking is able to largely go unnoticed in mainstream discourse,
leading developers to becoming complacent in the idea that their technologies are innocuous and
safe.
As of the year 2020, women make up less than 30% of the technology workforce (CNBC,
2020). The historic underrepresentation of women in this field is rooted in antiquated
assumptions about gender roles, and how those roles translate to interactions with technology.
Technology has long been viewed as a “hard” science innately suited to men, while women fall
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on the receiving end of technological innovation as passive consumers or even objects of
surveillance.
When considering the concerns regarding technology’s role in facilitating gender-based
violence and intimate partner violence, it is appropriate and even necessary to point to the lack of
equal gender representation in technology development as a cause of these considerations being
overlooked. In fact, the wide potential for disparate outcomes for women using social
technologies that tacitly allow acts of gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence
and stalking, exemplifies Hoffmann’s concept of data violence. With men in the majority of
tech-based roles, often playing pivotal roles in the development and maintenance of widely used
apps, concerns that are less likely to impact men (such as of gender-based violence and intimate
partner violence) can go unaddressed-- leaving these apps to enter the public with glaring
security risks. On the other hand, including more women in app development increases the
likelihood that these gender-based concerns will be properly addressed. One example of this is
the social networking and dating app Bumble, founded by Whitney Wolfe Herd. Wolde Herd has
described Bumble as “100 percent feminist”, referring to the app’s highly discussed feature of
only allowing women users to send the first message in heterosexual matches (Yashari, 2015,
para. 9). Not only does this design choice deliberately challenge traditional heteronormative
dynamics of dating, it also enhances safety for women users by preventing unsolicited messaging
and harassment from men. Improving technology’s impact on women’s safety will involve not
only hiring more women in tech, but continually working to change the culture and the
conversation surrounding technology and the socially-constructed values we have come to
associate with it, leading to innovation that enhances safety and inclusivity.
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As technological capabilities only continue to expand, it also may be worth considering
introducing new forms of authentication to combat advanced cybersecurity threats, including
those that may come from others we know. More intimate safeguards, such as facial recognition
and fingerprint identification, have been introduced in recent years and are currently in use as
part of many mainstream devices’ security features. It is possible that mechanisms such as these
may ultimately grow to surpass the username and passwords we are currently familiar with.
However, the integration of bodily data into technology is a highly contentious issue, raising
more concerns about its implications for privacy and independence. Thus, for these kinds of
mechanisms to be implemented as ethically as possible, changes must first be enacted— both
legally, to impose regulations on big tech in regards to collecting, storing, and sharing data; and
socially, to ensure that these impactful technologies are designed with as little bias as possible—
to keep the internet and the technological world as accessible and safe as possible.
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